How Digital Sovereignty Can Help Prevent Geopolitical Bullying
Introduction
The 2026 geopolitical landscape is defined by techno-nationalism, digital fragmentation, and the systematic use of technology as a tool of state power
The intersection of technology and geopolitics has transformed digital infrastructure from a purely technical consideration into a strategic asset that determines national autonomy and resilience. As global tensions intensify and major powers increasingly weaponize technological dependencies, digital sovereignty has emerged as a critical defense mechanism against geopolitical coercion. The 2026 geopolitical landscape is defined by techno-nationalism, digital fragmentation, and the systematic use of technology as a tool of state power. Understanding how digital sovereignty functions as a bulwark against such pressures requires examining both the mechanisms of technological coercion and the frameworks through which nations and enterprises can reclaim control over their digital destinies.
The Architecture of Geopolitical Bullying Through Technology
Geopolitical bullying manifests through technology in increasingly sophisticated forms that exploit the structural dependencies created by globalized digital infrastructure. The United States CLOUD Act exemplifies extraterritorial overreach, enabling American authorities to demand data from US-based service providers regardless of where that information is physically stored. This legislation effectively attempts to extend American legal jurisdiction across international boundaries, compelling organizations worldwide to surrender data that may be subject to competing legal obligations under frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation. The conflict between the CLOUD Act and European privacy protections came to a head in the Schrems II decision, where the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the Privacy Shield agreement, determining that US surveillance laws do not provide adequate protection for European data. Technology sanctions represent another potent instrument of coercion, as demonstrated by the comprehensive export controls imposed on Iran and the coordinated campaign against Huawei’s 5G infrastructure. The United States has systematically leveraged its control over critical semiconductor supply chains to restrict Iran’s access to dual-use technologies, forcing the establishment of elaborate networks designed to circumvent these restrictions. The Huawei case reveals how infrastructure dependencies become political leverage, with Washington pressuring Five Eyes alliance members and European partners to ban Chinese telecommunications equipment under threat of severed intelligence sharing. These measures forced nations to make binary choices between technological partnerships and geopolitical alignment, demonstrating how supply chain control translates into diplomatic pressure.
Platform bans and content control mechanisms further illustrate the coercive potential of digital infrastructure
Platform bans and content control mechanisms further illustrate the coercive potential of digital infrastructure. The TikTok controversy in the United States highlights concerns about algorithmic influence and data collection by platforms subject to foreign government pressure. The national security rationale invoked to justify potential bans rests on China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which compels Chinese companies to assist in intelligence gathering if requested. This creates a scenario where popular communications platforms become potential vectors for foreign influence operations, with user data and algorithmic content amplification serving as mechanisms through which authoritarian governments might shape discourse in democratic societies. The debate surrounding TikTok illustrates the fundamental tension between free expression rights and national security imperatives in the digital age, with platforms increasingly caught between competing jurisdictional claims. Data localization mandates imposed by authoritarian regimes represent the inverse form of coercion, compelling foreign companies to store and process data within borders where they become subject to local surveillance and control. China’s Cybersecurity Law requires critical information infrastructure operators to store personal information and important data within mainland China, with broad and ambiguous definitions leaving room for expansive government intervention. Russia has similarly weaponized data residency requirements, using sovereignty rhetoric to pressure social media platforms and technology companies into compliance with content removal demands and local storage mandates. These measures force organizations to choose between market access and data security, with the implicit threat that non-compliance will result in exclusion from economically significant jurisdictions.
Data localization mandates imposed by authoritarian regimes represent the inverse form of coercion.
Supply chain attacks such as the SolarWinds incident demonstrate how trusted software vendors can become unwitting conduits for sophisticated espionage campaigns. The 2020 breach, allegedly orchestrated by Russian intelligence, compromised approximately 18,000 customers worldwide by inserting malicious code into legitimate software updates. This attack highlighted the vulnerability of IT supply chains, where a single compromise can cascade across thousands of organizations, including government agencies and critical infrastructure operators. The SolarWinds case underscores that digital sovereignty requires not merely control over data location but comprehensive assurance over the entire technology stack, from hardware manufacturing through software development to operational deployment.
The SolarWinds case underscores that digital sovereignty requires not merely control over data location but comprehensive assurance over the entire technology stack, from hardware manufacturing through software development to operational deployment
Vulnerability Through Systemic Dependency
The concentration of digital infrastructure under the control of a handful of American and Chinese technology giants creates structural vulnerabilities that enable geopolitical coercion.
Approximately 92 percent of western data resides on US-owned cloud infrastructure, creating a dependency relationship that exposes European and allied data to extraterritorial legal claims. Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud collectively control around 70 percent of the European cloud market, meaning that critical government services, healthcare systems, financial infrastructure, and commercial operations depend on providers subject to American legal jurisdiction. This concentration means that disputes between the United States and European nations over regulatory frameworks such as the Digital Markets Act can escalate into threats against critical infrastructure access.
Approximately 92 percent of western data resides on US-owned cloud infrastructure, creating a dependency relationship that exposes European and allied data to extraterritorial legal claims.
The semiconductor supply chain represents another critical chokepoint where technological dependencies translate into geopolitical leverage. Europe currently accounts for only 10 percent of global semiconductor production, with advanced chip manufacturing concentrated in Taiwan, South Korea, and the United States. This dependency became starkly apparent when export controls targeting Huawei and Chinese semiconductor companies demonstrated how access to advanced chips could be weaponized for strategic purposes. The Netherlands’ ASML holds a monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography machines essential for manufacturing cutting-edge semiconductors, making it a focal point of geopolitical competition as the United States pressures Amsterdam to restrict exports to China while Beijing warns of economic consequences. Artificial intelligence infrastructure dependencies compound these vulnerabilities, as training large language models and deploying sophisticated AI systems require access to advanced computing resources, specialized chips, and extensive datasets. American companies control the most capable AI model architectures and the computational infrastructure necessary to develop and deploy them at scale. This creates a scenario where European enterprises and governments risk becoming dependent on AI systems whose training data, architectural decisions, and operational parameters reflect non-European priorities and potentially incompatible values. The opaque nature of proprietary AI systems further exacerbates sovereignty concerns, as organizations cannot audit how these models make decisions affecting citizens’ rights, access to services, or economic opportunities
The Digital Sovereignty Framework
Digital sovereignty encompasses four interconnected dimensions that collectively enable organizations and nations to maintain autonomous control over their technological ecosystems.
- Data sovereignty addresses control over data location, access, and governance, ensuring that information remains subject to jurisdictions that respect privacy rights and democratic oversight.
- Technology sovereignty focuses on independence from proprietary vendors through adoption of open standards, interoperable systems, and transparent technology stacks that can be inspected, modified, and controlled without external permissions.
- Operational sovereignty ensures autonomous control over processes, policies, and procedures, enabling organizations to make decisions aligned with their values and legal obligations rather than vendor requirements or foreign government demands.
- Assurance sovereignty provides verifiable integrity and security across systems, establishing trust through transparency, auditability, and demonstrable compliance with established standards.
These dimensions work in synergy to create resilience against geopolitical pressure. An organization might achieve data sovereignty by storing information within national borders, but without technology sovereignty through open-source infrastructure, it remains vulnerable to vendor actions such as Microsoft’s sudden price increases that prompted French regions to migrate away from proprietary software. Similarly, operational sovereignty requires not merely formal control but the technical expertise and organizational capacity to exercise that control independently, as Estonia demonstrated through its X-Road infrastructure that enables secure government data exchange while maintaining complete national control.
European Strategic Response
The European Union has recognized digital sovereignty as essential to strategic autonomy and has launched comprehensive initiatives to address technological dependencies. The GAIA-X project aims to establish a federated, secure data infrastructure based on European values of transparency, openness, and data protection. Rather than competing directly with hyperscale American cloud providers through massive capital investments, GAIA-X focuses on creating standards, governance frameworks, and interoperability requirements that enable European cloud providers to offer services meeting sovereignty requirements while remaining competitive on capabilities. The initiative establishes data spaces for sectors including healthcare, automotive, and energy, facilitating secure information exchange while ensuring participants retain control over data access and usage. The European Chips Act represents a 43 billion euro commitment to double the continent’s share of global semiconductor production from 10 to 20 percent by 2030. This industrial policy acknowledges that technological autonomy requires domestic manufacturing capacity for critical components, reducing vulnerability to export controls and supply chain disruptions. The legislation permits state subsidies for semiconductor projects and coordinates member state efforts to avoid fragmentation that would undermine European competitiveness. Projects such as TSMC’s German facility and Intel’s European expansion demonstrate how the Chips Act incentivizes investment in European manufacturing infrastructure, though challenges remain around coordination among member states and the massive capital requirements involved. The Digital Markets Act tackles platform dominance by imposing specific obligations on designated gatekeeper companies, preventing anti-competitive practices that lock users into closed ecosystems. By requiring interoperability, data portability, and fair treatment of third-party services, the DMA aims to reduce dependence on dominant American platforms while creating space for European alternatives to emerge.
By requiring interoperability, data portability, and fair treatment of third-party services, the DMA aims to reduce dependence on dominant American platforms while creating space for European alternatives to emerge
The regulation has drawn sharp criticism from the Trump administration, which characterizes it as discriminatory protectionism and has threatened retaliatory measures, but European officials view it as essential to preserving regulatory sovereignty and preventing platform monopolies from undermining democratic governance. The EU AI Act establishes the world’s first comprehensive legal framework for artificial intelligence, classifying systems by risk level and imposing proportionate requirements for transparency, safety, and fundamental rights protection. By regulating AI at the European level, the legislation aims to ensure that systems deployed within the Union align with European values regardless of where they were developed. The Act includes specific provisions for general-purpose AI models, imposing transparency requirements and additional evaluations for high-capability systems, while providing reduced requirements for open-source models to encourage development of sovereign alternatives. This regulatory approach seeks to balance innovation with accountability, creating conditions where European AI development can flourish without sacrificing safety or democratic values.
Open Source as Sovereignty Infrastructure
Open-source software provides foundational building blocks for digital sovereignty by offering transparency, eliminating vendor lock-in, and enabling complete control over technological ecosystems. Unlike proprietary solutions where organizations depend on vendor roadmaps, pricing decisions, and ongoing support, open-source platforms grant users the freedom to inspect source code, modify functionality, deploy wherever desired, and maintain systems independently.
- PostgreSQL demonstrates this principle in database management, offering enterprise-grade capabilities without the licensing costs and restrictions associated with Oracle or SQL Server, while enabling organizations to deploy on-premises, in private clouds, or across hybrid environments according to sovereignty requirements.
- ERPNext exemplifies open-source enterprise resource planning, providing comprehensive business management capabilities under the GNU General Public License without the vendor lock-in and cost structures that characterize SAP or Oracle systems. The platform’s open architecture enables organizations to customize workflows, develop specialized integrations, and maintain complete control over business data without requiring vendor approval or incurring additional fees. With over 30,000 deployments globally, ERPNext demonstrates that open-source solutions can achieve enterprise scale while preserving organizational autonomy.
- Corteza represents the next generation of low-code sovereignty platforms, enabling organizations to build custom business applications without extensive coding while maintaining complete control over the underlying technology stack. Licensed under Apache 2.0, Corteza provides workflow automation, case management, and customer relationship management capabilities that can be deployed entirely within organizational infrastructure, ensuring that sensitive business processes and customer data remain under direct control. The platform’s modular architecture and extensive API support facilitate integration with other sovereign systems while avoiding dependencies on proprietary platforms whose terms of service or legal jurisdictions might conflict with organizational requirements.
- The Sovereign Cloud Stack initiative takes the open-source sovereignty approach to infrastructure level, providing a complete, modular software stack for deploying infrastructure-as-a-service and container-as-a-service environments. Built on proven components including OpenStack and Kubernetes, SCS enables cloud service providers to offer sovereign alternatives to hyperscale American platforms while maintaining full interoperability and transparency. The project emphasizes operational sovereignty through open operations practices, certification programs that verify compliance with standards, and federation capabilities that enable multiple providers to offer compatible services without fragmenting the ecosystem.
Implementation Pathways and Real-World Adoption
Practical implementation of digital sovereignty requires strategic approaches that balance idealism with operational realities. France’s Île-de-France Region demonstrated this through its migration from Microsoft 365 to the sovereign alternative eXo Platform, reducing annual costs by 75 percent while establishing better control over data for 550,000 high school students and teachers. This decision was driven by multiple factors: protection of minor students’ data from extraterritorial laws, sharp price increases from Microsoft, and the strategic objective of reinvesting in the local digital ecosystem. The gradual approach, starting with collaboration tools while supporting organizational change through training and field feedback, enabled successful adoption without overwhelming staff with disruptive transitions. Germany’s Schleswig-Holstein state undertook an even more ambitious migration, moving 40,000 Microsoft Exchange accounts to open-source alternatives including Nextcloud, LibreOffice, and Open-Xchange. This initiative reflects growing recognition that sustainable digital autonomy requires moving beyond rhetoric to implement concrete alternatives, even when such transitions involve significant short-term costs and organizational adjustment. The German case demonstrates that sovereignty is achievable at scale when political leadership commits to long-term strategic objectives rather than optimizing solely for immediate costs or convenience. Estonia’s X-Road infrastructure represents perhaps the most comprehensive sovereignty success story, providing the secure data exchange backbone that enabled the country to achieve 100 percent digitalization of government services. Designed to enable secure, cost-efficient data sharing across government agencies while minimizing integration complexity, X-Road operates over the public internet using standardized protocols that ensure interoperability between public and private sector systems. The platform’s success has made it a global model, with Finland adopting the system through the Nordic Institute for Interoperability Solutions and Ukraine implementing a similar framework called Trembita to maintain government operations even during wartime. Estonia’s experience demonstrates that digital sovereignty, far from being a constraint on innovation or efficiency, can actually enhance both when implemented with strategic foresight and technical excellence.
Limitations, Trade-offs, and Strategic Considerations
Digital sovereignty implementation involves substantial challenges and trade-offs that must be acknowledged and managed
Digital sovereignty implementation involves substantial challenges and trade-offs that must be acknowledged and managed. The cost structure differs significantly from hyperscale cloud services, which benefit from massive economies of scale that enable competitive pricing for standardized offerings. Sovereign alternatives typically involve higher initial investments in infrastructure, greater complexity in operations, and ongoing expenses for specialized expertise. Organizations must invest in local data centers, establish operational teams capable of managing complex systems without vendor support, and maintain compliance frameworks that address jurisdiction-specific requirements. Studies suggest that compliance costs alone can absorb significant resources through audits, encryption implementation, monitoring systems, and legal oversight. Technical capabilities represent another constraint, as sovereign solutions sometimes lag behind hyperscale providers in feature breadth, geographic distribution, and cutting-edge capabilities such as advanced AI services. Organizations adopting sovereign clouds may find themselves managing multiple systems to achieve functionality readily available from integrated providers, increasing operational complexity and requiring more sophisticated technical teams. The shortage of personnel with jurisdiction-specific security and compliance expertise compounds this challenge, as successful sovereignty implementation requires not merely technical skills but deep understanding of regulatory requirements, geopolitical risks, and organizational governance The fragmentation risk emerges when sovereignty initiatives proceed without coordination, creating incompatible systems that increase costs for vendors and users while undermining the interoperability benefits of standardized platforms. The Sovereign Cloud Stack project explicitly addresses this concern through standardization efforts and certification programs designed to ensure compatibility across different sovereign providers. Similarly, GAIA-X emphasizes federation and shared standards to prevent European sovereignty efforts from creating a patchwork of incompatible national solutions that would reduce competitiveness and limit economies of scale. Despite these challenges, organizations increasingly view sovereignty as a strategic imperative rather than a discretionary expense.
Research by OVHcloud found that 65 percent of organizations are willing to pay 11 to 30 percent premiums for sovereign technology products meeting regulatory and sovereignty requirements, with only 6.5 percent unwilling to pay any premium.
Research by OVHcloud found that 65 percent of organizations are willing to pay 11 to 30 percent premiums for sovereign technology products meeting regulatory and sovereignty requirements, with only 6.5 percent unwilling to pay any premium. This willingness reflects growing recognition that sovereignty provides tangible benefits including enhanced customer trust, improved governance, reduced geopolitical risk, and protection against vendor coercion such as arbitrary price increases or sudden feature changes.
Digital Sovereignty as Geopolitical Resilience
The 2026 geopolitical landscape is characterized by what analysts describe as a fragmenting global order, with US-China competition intensifying, multiple military conflicts ongoing, and the increasing use of gray-zone tactics including cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation targeting corporate infrastructure. In this environment, digital sovereignty transitions from a defensive posture to a proactive strategy for building resilience against diverse forms of coercion. Organizations and nations that establish sovereign infrastructure position themselves to weather disruptions whether they originate from hostile governments, vendor disputes, regulatory conflicts, or supply chain compromises. The resilience value of sovereignty became apparent during the SolarWinds attack, where organizations dependent on compromised software found themselves facing sophisticated espionage regardless of their security practices because the vulnerability existed in their supply chain. Sovereign approaches emphasizing open-source components, supply chain transparency, and operational control would have provided earlier detection and faster remediation because the affected organizations would possess both technical access to their systems and operational capacity to respond independently rather than waiting for vendor patches and guidance. The accelerating push toward sovereign AI reflects recognition that algorithmic systems increasingly mediate access to information, services, and opportunities. When these systems are developed by foreign entities using training data and architectural choices reflecting different values and priorities, they introduce subtle but pervasive forms of dependency. Sovereign AI initiatives emphasize local training data reflecting national languages and cultures, governance frameworks ensuring accountability and transparency, and operational control enabling intervention when systems produce unacceptable outcomes. The EU AI Act’s regulatory approach aims to ensure that regardless of development origin, AI systems deployed in Europe meet European standards for safety, transparency, and fundamental rights protection.
The 2026 geopolitical landscape is characterized by what analysts describe as a fragmenting global order, with US-China competition intensifying, multiple military conflicts ongoing, and the increasing use of gray-zone tactics including cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation targeting corporate infrastructure.
The Path Forward: Integration Without Dependency
Digital sovereignty does not require autarky or technological isolation, which would be economically inefficient and technically counterproductive. Rather, it demands strategic choices about which dependencies are acceptable and which create unacceptable vulnerabilities, combined with deliberate investments in capabilities that enable autonomous operation when necessary. The GAIA-X federation model exemplifies this approach, enabling European and international providers to participate in a common data infrastructure ecosystem while adhering to European governance principles and sovereignty requirements. This creates optionality, where organizations can choose from multiple providers offering compatible services rather than being locked into single vendor ecosystems. The Sovereign Cloud Stack similarly emphasizes interoperability and federation, ensuring that organizations adopting sovereign infrastructure can still collaborate globally while maintaining control over their own systems. The modular architecture enables mixing sovereign components with external services according to risk assessments and operational requirements, rather than imposing binary choices between complete sovereignty and cloud efficiency. This pragmatic approach acknowledges that different workloads have different sovereignty requirements: processing health records for national citizens requires stringent data sovereignty, while collaborating on open-source software development involves different considerations. Open-source foundations provide critical enabling infrastructure for this balanced approach because they eliminate the binary choice between vendor dependency and isolation. Organizations adopting PostgreSQL or Kubernetes gain access to cutting-edge capabilities developed by global communities while maintaining the option to operate independently if geopolitical circumstances require. The transparency of open-source systems enables security auditing, the absence of licensing restrictions prevents vendor coercion through pricing changes or feature limitations, and the community governance model ensures no single nation or company controls the technology’s evolution.
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